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ABSTRACT
We present a model to study the dynamics of risk premia during crises in asset markets where the
marginal investor is a financial intermediary. Intermediaries face a constraint on raising equity capital.
When the constraint binds, so that intermediaries’ equity capital is scarce, risk premia rise to reflect
the capital scarcity. We calibrate the model and show that it does well in matching two aspects of crises:
the nonlinearity of risk premia during crisis episodes; and, the speed of adjustment in risk premia from
a cri- sis back to pre-crisis levels. We use the model to quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of
a variety of central bank policies, including reducing intermediaries’ borrowing costs, infusing equity
capital, and directly intervening in distressed asset markets. All of these policies are effective in aiding
the recovery from a crisis. Infusing equity capital into intermediaries is particularly effective because
it attacks the equity capital constraint that is at the root of the crisis in our model.
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The performance of many asset markets – e.g., prices of mortgage-backed securities, corporate
bonds, etc. – depend on the ﬁnancial health of the intermediary sector, broadly deﬁned
to include traditional commercial banks as well as investment banks and hedge funds. The
subprime crisis and the 1998 hedge fund crisis are two compelling data points in support of this
claim.1 However, traditional approaches to asset pricing ignore intermediation by invoking the
assumption that intermediaries’ actions reﬂect the preferences of their client-investors. With
this assumption, the traditional approach treats intermediaries as a “veil,” and instead posits
that a representative household is marginal in pricing all assets. Thus, the pricing kernel for
the S&P500 stock index is the same as the pricing kernel for mortgage-backed securities. Yet,
many crises, such as the subprime crisis and the 1998 episode, play out primarily in the more
complex securities that are the province of the intermediary sector. The traditional approach
cannot speak to this relationship between ﬁnancial intermediaries and asset prices. It sheds
no light on why “intermediary capital” is important for asset market equilibrium. It also does
not allow for a meaningful analysis of the policy actions, such as increasing intermediaries’
equity capital or discount window lending, which are commonly considered during crises.
We oﬀer a framework to address these issues. We develop a model in which the intermedi-
ary sector is not a veil, and in which its capital plays an important role in determining asset
market equilibrium. We calibrate the model to data on the intermediation sector and show
that the model performs well in replicating asset market behavior during crises.
The striking feature of ﬁnancial crises is the sudden and dramatic increase of risk premia.
For example, in the hedge fund crisis of the fall of 1998, many credit spreads and mortgage-
backed security spreads doubled from their pre-crisis levels. Our baseline calibration can
replicate this dramatic behavior. When intermediary capital is low, losses within the inter-
mediary sector have signiﬁcant eﬀects on risk premia. However, when capital is high, losses
have little to no eﬀect on risk premia. The asymmetry in our model captures the non-linearity
that is present in asset market crises. Simulating the model, we ﬁnd that the average risk
premium when intermediaries’ capital constraint is slack is 3.1%. Using this number to reﬂect
a pre-crisis normal level, we ﬁnd that the probability of the risk premium exceeding 6%, which
1There is a growing body of empirical evidence documenting the eﬀects of intermediation constraints
(such as capital or collateral constraints) on asset prices. These studies include, research on mortgage-backed
securities (Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron, 2005), corporate bonds (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and
Martin, 2001), default swaps (Berndt, et. al., 2004), catastrophe insurance (Froot and O’Connell, 1999), and
index options (Bates, 2003; Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman, 2005).
2is twice the “normal” level, is 1.6%. The 1998 episode saw risk premia and Sharpe ratios rise
considerably, in the range of 2X.
Another important feature of ﬁnancial crises is the pattern of recovery of spreads. In the
1998 crisis, most spreads took about 10 months to halve from their crisis-peak levels to pre-
crisis levels. In the subprime crisis, most bond market spreads recovered in about 6 months.
As we discuss later in the paper, half-lives of between 6 months and extending over a year
have been documented in a variety of asset markets and crisis situations. We note that these
types of recovery patterns are an order of magnitude slower than the daily mean reversion
patterns documented in the market microstructure literature (e.g., Campbell, Grossman, and
Wang, 1993). A common wisdom among many observers is that this recovery reﬂects the
slow movement of capital into the aﬀected markets (Froot and O’Connell, 1999, Berndt, et.
al., 2004, Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino, 2007). Our baseline calibration of the model can
replicate these speeds of capital movement. We show that simulating the model starting from
an extreme crisis state (risk premium of 12%), the half-life of the risk premium back to the
unconditional average risk premium is 8 months. From a risk premium of 10%, the half-life is
11 months.
We also use the model as a laboratory to quantitatively evaluate government policies. Be-
ginning from an extreme crisis state with risk premium of 12%, we trace the crisis recovery
path conditional on three government policies: (1) Infusing equity capital into the intermedi-
aries during a crisis; (2) Lowering borrowing rates to the intermediary, as with a decrease in
the central bank’s discount rate; and, (3) Direct purchase of the risky asset by the government,
ﬁnanced by debt issuance and taxation of households. These three policies are chosen because
they are among those undertaken by central banks in practice. Both the equity infusion and
risky asset purchase policies have an immediate impact of lowering the risk premium. More-
over, in comparing $205bn of equity infusion to $1.8tn of risky asset purchase, we ﬁnd that
the equity infusion is far more eﬀective in reducing the risk premium. This occurs in our
model because the friction in the model is an equity capital constraint. Thus infusing equity
capital attacks the problem at its heart. The interest rate policy is also eﬀective, uniformly
increasing the speed of crisis recovery.
The contribution of our paper is to work out an equilibrium model of intermediation
that is dynamic, parsimonious, and can be realistically calibrated. The paper is related to a
large literature in banking studying disintermediation and crises (see Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Diamond (1997), and Diamond and Rajan (2005)).
We diﬀer from this literature in that our model is dynamic, while much of this literature
3is static. The paper is also related to the literature in macroeconomics studying eﬀects of
collateral ﬂuctuations on aggregate activity (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). In much of the
macro literature, equilibrium is derived by log-linearizing around the steady-state. As a result,
there is almost no variation in equilibrium risk premia, which does not allow the models to
speak to the behavior of risk premia in crises. We solve a fully stochastic model that better
explains how risk premia varies as a function of intermediary capital. Brunnermeier and
Sannikov (2010) is another recent paper that develops a macroeconomic model that is fully
stochastic and links intermediaries’ ﬁnancing position to asset prices. Our paper is also related
to the literature on limits to arbitrage studying how impediments to arbitrageurs’ trading
strategies may aﬀect equilibrium asset prices (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). One part of this
literature explores the eﬀects of margin or debt constraints for asset prices and liquidity in
dynamic models (see Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Geanokoplos and Fostel (2008), Adrian and
Shin (2010), and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008)). Our paper shares many objectives and
features of these models. The principal diﬀerence is that we study a constraint on raising
equity capital, while these papers study a constraint on raising debt ﬁnancing. Xiong (2001)
and Kyle and Xiong (2001) model the eﬀect of arbitrageur capital on asset prices by studying
an arbitrageur with log preferences, where risk aversion decreases with wealth. The eﬀects
that arise in our model our qualitatively similar to these papers. An advantage of our paper is
that intermediaries and their equity capital are explictly modeled allowing our paper to better
articulate the role of intermediaries in crises.2 Finally, many of our asset pricing results come
from assuming that some markets are segmented and that households can only trade in these
markets by accessing intermediaries. Our paper is related to the literature on asset pricing
with segmented markets (see Allen and Gale, 1994, Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe, 2002, and
Edmond and Weill, 2009).3
Our paper is also related to a companion paper, He and Krishnamurthy (2009). We solve
for the optimal intermediation contract in that paper, while we assume the (same) form of
contract in the current analysis. That paper also solves for the equilibrium asset prices in
closed form, while we rely on numerical solutions in the present paper. On the other hand,
that paper has a degenerate steady state distribution which does not allow for a meaningful
simulation or the other quantitative exerciseswe perform in the present paper. In addition, the
2The paper is also related to Vayanos (2005) who studies the eﬀect of an open-ending friction on asset-
demand by intermediaries. We study a capital constraint rather than an open-ending friction.
3Our model is also related to the asset pricing literature with heterogenous agents (see Dumas (1989) and
Wang (1996)).
4present paper models households with labor income and an intermediation sector which always
carries some leverage. Both aspects of the model are important in realistically calibrating the
model. However, these same features of the model require us to rely on numerical solutions.
Apart from these diﬀerences, the analysis in He and Krishnamurthy (2009) provides theoretical
underpinnings for some of the assumptions we make in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 outline the model and its solution.
Section 4 explains how we calibrate the model. Section 5 presents the results of the crisis
calibration. Section 6 studies policy actions. Section 7 concludes and is followed by an
Appendix with details of the model solution.
2 The Model: Intermediation and Asset Prices












This ﬁgure depicts the agents in the economy and their investment opportunities.
Figure 1 lays out the building blocks of our model. There is a risky asset that repre-
sents complex assets where investment requires some sophistication. In our calibration, we
match the risky asset to the market for mortgage-backed securities, as a representative large
asset class that ﬁts this description. Investment in the mortgage-backed securities market
is dominated by ﬁnancial institutions rather than households, and sophisticated prepayment
modeling is an important part of the investment strategy. The calibration is also appropriate
for analyzing the ﬁnancial crisis that began in 2007, where mortgage-backed securities have a
prominent role.
5We assume that households cannot invest directly in the risky asset market. There is
limited market participation, as in Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), Allen and Gale (1994), Basak
and Cuoco (1998), or Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). Specialists have the knowledge to invest in
the risky assets, and unlike in the limited market participation literature, the specialists can
invest in the risky asset on behalf of the households. This investment conduit is the interme-
diary of our model. In our model, the households demand intermediation services while the
specialists supply these services. We are centrally interested in describing how this interme-
diation relationship aﬀects and is aﬀected by the market equilibrium for the “intermediated”
risky asset.
We assume that if the household does not invest in the intermediary, it can only invest in
a riskless short-term bond. This is clearly counterfactual (i.e. households invest in the S&P
500 index), but simpliﬁes the analysis considerably.
Households thus face a portfolio choice decision of allocating funds between the interme-
diaries and the riskless bond. The intermediaries accept Ht of the household funds and then
allocate their total funds under management between the risky asset and the riskless bond.
We elaborate on each of the elements of the model in the next sections.
2.1 Assets
The assets are modeled as in the Lucas (1978) tree economy. The economy is inﬁnite-horizon,
continuous-time, and has a single perishable consumption good, which we will use as the
numeraire. We normalize the total supply of intermediated risky assets to be one unit. The
riskless bond is in zero net supply and can be invested in by both households and specialists.




= gdt + σdZt given D0. (1)
g > 0 and σ > 0 are constants. Throughout this paper {Zt} is a standard Brownian motion
on a complete probability space (Ω,F,P). We denote the processes {Pt} and {rt} as the risky






62.2 Specialists and intermediation
There is a unit mass of identical specialists who manage the intermediaries in which the
households invest. The specialists represent the insiders/decision-makers of a bank, hedge
fund, or mutual fund. We collapse all of an intermediary’sinsidersinto a single agent, following
the device of modeling entrepreneur-managers of ﬁrms in the corporate ﬁnance literature (e.g.








ρ > 0; (3)
where ct is the date t consumption rate of the specialist. We consider a CRRA instantaneous




Each specialist manages one intermediary. We denote the date t wealth of specialists as wt
and assume that this is wholly invested in the intermediary. We think of wt as the specialist’s
“stake” in the intermediary, possibly capturing ﬁnancial wealth at risk in the intermediary.
Although outside the scope of the model, we may imagine that wt also captures reputation that
is at stake in the intermediary and the future income from being an insider of the intermediary.
We envision the following to describe the interaction between specialists and households.
At every t, each specialist is randomly matched with a household to form an intermediary.
These interactions occur instantaneously and result in a continuum of (identical) bilateral
relationships.4 The household allocates some funds Ht to the intermediary. Specialists then
execute trades for the intermediary in a Walrasian risky asset and bond market, and the house-
hold trades in only the bond market. At t + dt the match is broken, and the intermediation
market repeats itself.
Consider one of the intermediary relationships between specialist and household. The
specialist manages an intermediary whose total capital is the sum of the specialist’s wealth,
wt, and the wealth that the household allocates to the intermediary, Ht. The specialist makes
all investment decisions on this capital and faces no portfolio restrictions in buying or short-
selling either the risky asset or the riskless bond. Suppose that the specialist chooses to invest
a fraction αI
t of the portfolio in the risky asset and 1 − αI
t in the riskless asset. Then, the
4Why the matching structure instead of a Walrasian intermediation market? In the Walrasian case, when
intermediation is supply constrained, specialists charge the households a fee for managing the intermediary
that depends on the tightness of the intermediation constraint. In the matching structure the fee is always
zero which makes solving the model somewhat easier. Introducing a constant fee into the model is both easy
and does not alter results appreciably. See He and Krishnamurthy (2009) where we study the Walrasian case.
7return delivered by the intermediary is,
g dRt = rtdt + α
I
t(dRt − rtdt), (4)
where dRt is the total return on the risky asset.
2.3 Intermediary equity capital constraint
The key assumption of our model is that the household is unwilling to invest more than mwt
of funds in the intermediary (m > 0 is a constant). That is, if the specialist has one dollar of
wealth invested in the intermediary, the household will only invest up to m dollars of his own
wealth in the intermediary. He and Krishnamurthy (2009) derive this sort of capital constraint
by assuming moral hazard by the specialist. In their model, the household requires that the
specialist have a suﬃcient stake in the intermediary to prevent shirking. Here we adopt the
constraint in reduced form.
The wealth requirement implies that the supply of intermediation facing a household is at
most,
Ht ≤ mwt. (5)
If either m is small or wt is small, the household’s ability to indirectly participate in the risky
asset market will be restricted.
We may interpret the wealth requirement in two ways. First, as noted above, we can think
of wt as the specialist’s stake in the intermediary, and this stake must be suﬃciently high for
households to feel comfortable with their investment in the intermediary. The managers of a
hedge fund typically have much of their wealth tied up in terms of the returns of the hedge
fund. Hedge fund managers invest some of their wealth in a hedge fund and moreover earn
future income based on the returns of the fund. Thus they have a signiﬁcant stake in the hedge
fund’s performance which is captured in our model by their ownership share, wt
wt+Ht ≥ 1
1+m.
The minimum stake requirement ensures that the incentives of the hedge fund’s managers
and investors are aligned. If a hedge fund loses a lot of money then the capital of the hedge
fund will be depleted. In this case, investors will be reluctant to contribute money to the
hedge fund, fearing mismanagement or further losses. A hedge fund “capital shock” is one
phenomena that we can capture with our model.
The ownership stake interpretation also applies more broadly to the banking sector. Hold-
erness, Kroszner and Sheehan (1999) report that the mean equity ownership of oﬃcers and
8directors in the Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate sector was 17.4% in 1995. This stake can
also be related to the fraction of the intermediary that the specialist owns,
wt
wt+Ht.
Another interpretation, which is more in keeping with regularities in the mutual fund
industry, is that the wealth of a specialist summarizes his past success in making investment
decisions. Low wealth then reﬂects poor past performance by a mutual fund, which makes
households reluctant to delegate investment decisions to the specialist. The relation between
past performance and mutual fund ﬂows is a well-documented empirical regularity (see, e.g.,
Warther (1995)). As wt falls, reﬂecting poor past performance, investors reduce their portfolio
allocation to the mutual fund. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) present a model with a similar
feature: the supply of funds to an arbitrageur in their model is a function of the previous
period’s return by the arbitrageur.
Since we adopt constraint (5) in reduced form, we do not take a stand on the interpretation
of the constraint. Indeed, in our calibration scenarios, we match the specialist-intermediary
to the entire intermediary sector – including hedge funds, banks, and mutual funds. From
this standpoint, it is useful that the constraint may be appropriate across a variety of inter-
mediaries.
The novel feature of our model is that wt, and the supply of intermediation, evolve en-
dogenously as a function of shocks and the past decisions of specialists and households. In
both the bank/hedge-fund and the mutual fund example, if the intermediation constraint (5)
binds, a fall in wt causes households to reduce their allocation of funds to intermediaries and
invest in the riskless bond. Of course, the risky asset still has to be held in equilibrium.
As households indirectly reduce their exposure to the risky asset, via market clearing, the
specialist increases his exposure to the risky asset. To induce the specialist to absorb more
risk, the risky asset price falls and its expected return rises. This dynamic eﬀect of wt on
the equilibrium is the central driving force of our model. We think it arises naturally when
considering the equilibrium eﬀects of intermediation.
We note that both the household and specialist receive the return g dRt (see (4)) on their
contributions to the intermediary; that is, both household and specialist invest in the equity
of the intermediary. Constraint (5) describes an equity capital constraint on the contribution
by the household to the intermediary as a function of the specialist’s equity contribution.
Another form of ﬁnancing constraint that appears important in practice and has been stud-
ied by other papers is a debt or leverage constraint. In our model, the intermediaries raise
equity capital from households as well as borrow by selling (i.e. shorting) riskless bonds. We
impose a constraint on raising equity capital but none on borrowing. Denote such borrowing
9as Bt. We can imagine a constraint whereby,
Bt ≤ m
bwt.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) in their study of collateral values and business cycles impose a
similar constraint. Papers in the asset pricing literature studying margin constraints also
impose a similar constraint (see Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Geanokoplos and Fostel (2008),
Adrian and Shin (2010), and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)). The margin requirement
of these models can be related to 1/mb.
We do not study a debt constraint in our model. First, within the logic of the model,
any debt that is contracted is always default-free and it thus seems unnatural to impose a
debt constraint. That is, Bt is always less than Pt so that if one considers a loan that is
collateralized by the asset (i.e. a repo contract), such borrowing carries no default risk. This
occurs because the asset price has a continuous sample path so that it is not possible to “jump”
into a default state. A model with jumps rather than our Brownian model or a discrete-time
model will carry default risk.5 Second, equity claims are junior to debt claims and particularly
to the collateralized debt claims we observe in practice. Thus any ﬁnancing constraints are
likely to be tighter on equity than debt. The inability of ﬁnancial institutions to raise equity
capital ﬁgures prominently in discussions of the subprime crisis.6 It is therefore interesting to
study a model that drills in particularly on the role of equity capital constraints. Third, as
an empirical matter, He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) document that, during the 2008
crisis period, the commercial banking sector through its access to deposits, discount window
ﬁnancing, as well as other forms of government ﬁnancing, has essentially faced no constraints
on borrowing, while the hedge fund sector has faced such constraints. On the other hand,
both the banking sector and the hedge fund sector have had limited equity capital. This
suggests that equity capital constraints are more widespread than debt constraints. It would
5It is likely that the constrained borrowing we observe in practice is not on 100% safe debt but on risky
debt. The fact that repo haircuts vary across the riskiness of the underlying collateral suggests that the
repo debt is only partly collateralized. Given standard spanning arguments, we can think of risky debt as a
combination of safe debt and a position in the underlying risky asset. That is deﬁne risky debt, ˜ Bt as being
composed of safe debt Bt and a position δ in the risky asset. Investors may ration their supply of risky debt
because they are rationing their exposure δ to the risky asset. The equity capital constraint we have imposed
is directly a restriction on investors willingness to own exposure to the risky asset; i.e. it is qualitativelysimilar
to a restriction on δ. In this sense, our model captures aspects of constrained risky-debt ﬁnancing.
6In He and Krishnamurthy (2009), we allow for all forms of contracts and derive an optimal contract that
places a constraint on equity capital contributions but no constraint on debt contributions.
10be interesting in future work to study a model with both debt and equity capital constraints
where diﬀerent parts of the intermediary sector are modeled to have diﬀerent constraints.
Indeed, it is likely, as we discuss later in the paper, that the model’s ﬁt can be improved with
such an embellishment.
2.4 Specialist/intermediary decision






















We can also rewrite the budget constraint in terms of the underlying return:
dwt = −ctdt + wtrtdt + α
I
twt (dRt − rtdt).
Note that αI
t is eﬀectively the specialist’s portfolio share in the risky asset.
2.5 Households: The demand for intermediation
We model the household sector as an overlapping generation (OG) of agents. This keeps the
decision problem of the household fairly simple.7 On the other hand, we enrich the model
to include household labor income and introduce heterogeneity within the household sector.
Without household income it is possible to reach states where the household sector vanishes
from the economy, rendering our analysis uninteresting (see, for example, Dumas (1989) and
Wang (1996) for more on this problem in two-agent models). We also introduce labor in-
come to more realistically match the consumption-savings proﬁle of households. Likewise,
heterogeneity within the household sector is useful in realistically calibrating the model.
For the sake of clarity in explaining the OG environment in a continuous time model, we
index time as t,t+δt,t+2δt,... and consider the continuous time limit when δt is of order dt.
A unit mass of generation t agents are born with wealth wh




t + (1 − ρδt)Et[ln w
h
t+δt]. (7)
7Note the specialists are inﬁnitely lived while households are modeled using the OG structure. As we will
see, specialists play the key role in determining asset prices. Our modeling ensures that their choices reﬂect the
forward-looking dynamics of the economy. We treat households in a simpler manner for tractability reasons.
We deem the cost of the simpliﬁcation to be low since households play a secondary role in the model.
11ch
t is the household’s consumption in period t and wh
t+δt is a bequest for generation t + δt.
Note that both utility and bequest functions are logarithmic.
In addition to wealth of wh
t , we assume that generation t households receive labor income
at date t of l Dt δ. l > 0 is a constant and Dt is the dividend on the risky asset at time t. Labor
income is assumed proportional to dividends in order to preserve some useful homogeneity
properties of the equilibrium.







In particular, note that the labor income does not aﬀect the consumption rule because the
labor income ﬂow is of order dt. Interpreting ρ > 0 as the household’s rate of time preference,
we note that this is the standard consumption rule for logarithmic agents. The household is
“myopic” and his rule does not depend on his investment opportunity set.
A household investsits wealth from t to t+δ in ﬁnancial assets. As noted earlier, households
are not directly able to save in the risky asset and can only directly access the riskless bond
market. We assume that the household can choose any positive level of bond holdings when
saving in the riskless bond (note that short-selling of the bond is ruled out). The household
must use an intermediary when accessing the risky asset market.
We consider a further degree of heterogeneity in the intermediation investment restriction.
We assume that a fraction λ of the households can ever only invest in the riskless bond. The
remaining fraction, 1 − λ, may enter the intermediation market and save a fraction of their
wealth with intermediaries which indirectly invest in the risky asset on their behalf. We refer
to the former as “debt households” and the latter as “risky asset households.”8
The heterogeneity among households is realistic. Clearly, there are many households that
only save in a bank account. In the literature cited earlier on limited market participation, all
households are “debt households.” The demand for intermediation in our model stems from
the risky asset households. Introducing this degree of heterogeneity allows for a better model
calibration.
8The wealth of the debt household and risky asset household evolve diﬀerently between t and t + δ. We
assume that this wealth is pooled together and distributed equally to all agents of generation t+δ. The latter
assumption ensures that we do not need to keep track of the distribution of wealth over the households when
solving for the equilibrium of the economy.
122.6 Household decisions
To summarize, a debt and risky asset household are born at generation t with wealth of wh
t .
The households receive labor income and choose a consumption rate of ρwh
t . They also make
savings decisions, respecting the restriction on their investment options. The debt household’s
consumption decision, given wealth of wh
t , is described by (8). The savings decision is to invest
wh
t in the bond market at the interest rate rt. The risky asset household’s consumption is also
described by (8). His portfolio decision is how much wealth to allocate to intermediaries. We
denote αh
t ∈ [0,1] as the fraction of the household’s wealth in the intermediary and recall that
the intermediary’s return is f dRt in (4). The remaining 1−αh
t of household wealth is invested
in the riskless bond and earns the interest rate of rtdt. The risky asset household chooses αh
t














V art[f dRt] s.t. α
h
t (1 − λ)w
h
t ≡ Ht ≤ mwt. (9)
Note the constraint here, which corresponds to the intermediationconstraint we have discussed
earlier.
Given the decisions by the debt household and the risky asset household, the evolution of
wh
t across generations is described by,
dw
h
t = (lDt − ρw
h
t )dt + w
h
t rtdt + α
h













1. Given the price processes, decisions solve the consumption-savings problems of the debt
household, the risky asset household (9) and the specialist (6);
2. Decisions satisfy the intermediation constraint of (5);







4. The goods market clears:
ct + c
h
t = Dt(1 + l). (12)
13Given market clearing in risky asset and goods markets, the bond market clears by Walras’
law. The market clearing condition for the risky asset market reﬂects that the intermediary is
the only direct holder of risky assets and has total funds under management of wt+αh
t(1−λ)wh
t ,
and the total holding of risky asset by the intermediary must equal the supply of risky assets.




That is, since bonds are in zero net supply, the wealth of specialists and households must sum
to the value of the risky asset.
3 Solution
We outline the main steps in deriving the solution in this section. For detailed derivations, see
the Appendix A. We begin with an example that illustrates the main features of our model
and helps in understanding the steps in the solution.
3.1 Example
Suppose that m = 1 and λ = 0. Moreover, suppose we are in a state where wt = 100
and wh
t = 200. Then it is clear that since mwt < wh
t , this is a state where intermediation
is constrained by (5). Since the riskless asset is in zero net supply, the value of the risky
asset is equal to the sum of wt and wh
t (i.e. 300). Suppose that households saturate the
intermediation constraint by investing 100 in intermediaries. Then intermediaries have total
equity contributions of 200 (the households’ 100 plus the specialists’ wt). Since intermediaries
hold all of the risky asset worth 300, their portfolio share in the risky asset must be equal to
150%. Their portfolio share in the bond is −50%. That is, the intermediary holds a levered
position in the risky asset. The household’s portfolio shares are 0.5 × 150% = 75% in risky
asset; and, 25% in debt. The households and specialists have diﬀerent portfolio exposures to
the risky asset. But since the specialist drives the pricing of the risky asset, risk premia must
adjust to make the 150% portfolio share optimal.
From this situation, suppose that dividends on the risky asset fall. Then, since the spe-
cialists are more exposed to the risky asset than households, wt falls relative to wh
t . The shock
then further tightens the intermediation constraint, which creates an ampliﬁed response to
the shock.
14Contrast this situation with one in which there is no intermediation constraint. Suppose
that households invest all of their wealth with the intermediaries. Since intermediaries now
have 300 and the risky asset is worth 300, the portfolio share of both specialists and households
is equal to 100%. Both agents share equally in the asset’s risk and shocks do not aﬀect the
distribution of wealth between the agetns.
3.2 State Variables and Specialists’ Euler Equation




Dt is the dividend scaled wealth of the household. As the example illustrates, the inter-
mediation frictions depend on the distribution of wealth between households and specialists.
We capture this relative distribution by yt.
As standard in any CRRA/GBM economy, our economy is homogeneous in dividends Dt.
We conjecture that the equilibrium risky asset price is,
Pt = DtF(yt), (13)
where F (y) is the price/dividend ratio of the risky asset.
Now we use the agents’ optimal decisions and market clearing conditions to derive the
equation for F. While the household faces investment restrictions on his portfolio choices, the
specialist (intermediary) is unconstrained in his portfolio choices. This important observation
implies that the specialist is always the marginal investor in determining asset prices, while
the household may not be. Standard arguments then tell us that we can express the pricing
kernel in terms of the specialist’s equilibrium consumption process.




which we can rewrite as ch
t = ρytDt. Now the market clearing condition for goods (from (12))
is,
ct + ρytDt = Dt(1 + l).
Thus, in equilibrium, the specialist consumes:
ct = Dt(1 + l − ρyt). (14)
We thereby express specialist consumption as a function of the state variables Dt and yt.






















and for interest rate, we have














Using (14) and (13), we can express dRt and
dct
ct as a function of the derivativesof F(y), and
the unknown drift and diﬀusion of yt. These unknown drift and diﬀusion will depend on the
households’ equilibrium portfolio choices, which is the focus of the next section. Combining
these results, we arrive at a diﬀerential equation that must be satisﬁed by F(y) (see Appendix
A).
3.3 Dynamics of Household Wealth
Given the wealth dynamics of the household in (10) and the intermediary return f dRt−rtdt =
αI
t (dRt − rtdt), we have
dw
h
t = (lDt − ρw
h












t (dRt − rtdt).






(1 − λ). First,




t (1 − λ)w
h
t = mwt, which implies, α
h,const
t =
m(F (y) − y)
(1 − λ)y
. (17)
That is, the binding constraint pins down the household’s portfolio share in the intermediary.
Moreover, since all risky assets are held through the intermediary, the equilibrium market
clearing condition (11) gives,
α
I,const
t (wt + mwt)
Pt
= 1.
Using the fact that wt + wh









The logic in arriving at this expression is the same as in the example.
When the intermediation constraint does not bind, the household is unconstrained in
choosing αh
t . We make an assumption that implies that αh
t = 1 in this case:
9The Euler equation is a necessary condition for optimality. In Appendix B, we prove suﬃciency.
16Parameter Assumption 1 We focus on parameters of the model such that in the absence
of any portfolio restrictions, the risky asset household will choose to have at least 100% of his
wealth invested in the intermediary, i.e., αh
t = 1.
Although we are unable to provide a precise mathematical condition for this parameter re-
striction, in our calibration it appears that γ ≥ 1 is a suﬃcient condition. Loosely speaking,
if the specialist is more risk averse than the household, the household will hold more risky
assets than the specialist. But given market clearing in the risky asset market, the specialist
always holds more than 100% of his wealth in the risky asset. Recall that we assume that the
household cannot short bonds. Thus, the household allocates the maximum of 100% of his








We now characterize the conditions under which the intermediation constraint binds. Setting
αh










1 + m − λ
F(y
c).
This equation has a unique solution in all of our parameterizations.
In summary, when y < yc, the intermediation constraint is binding, and we have the
expressions for αh
t and αI
t as in (17) and (18). When y > yc, the household chooses αh
t = 1
and αI
t is given by (19).
3.5 Boundary Condition
The model has a natural upper boundary condition on y that is determined by the goods
market clearing condition. Since
ct = Dt (1 + l − ρyt),






In Appendix B, we show that yb is an entrance-no-exit boundary, and that yt never reaches
yb.
On an equilibrium path in which y approaches yb, the specialist’s equilibrium consumption
c goes to zero. Since the specialist’s wealth is w = D (F (y) − y), one natural guess for the







In words, when the specialist’s consumption approaches zero, his wealth also converges to zero.
In the argument for veriﬁcation of optimality of the specialist’s equilibrium strategy which is
detailed in Appendix B, we see that this condition translates to the transversality condition
for the specialist’s budget equation. Therefore the boundary condition (20) is suﬃcient for
the equilibrium presented in this paper to be well-deﬁned.
4 Calibration
Table 1 provides data on the main intermediaries in the US economy. Households hold wealth
through a variety of intermediariesincluding banks, retirementfunds, mutual funds, and hedge
funds.10
4.1 Choice of m
The main challenge in the calibration is that the model treats the entire intermediary sector
as a group of identical institutions, while it is clear from Table 1 that there is functional
heterogeneity across the modes of intermediation. In particular, some of the intermediaries,
such as mutual and pension funds, are ﬁnanced only by equity, while some intermediaries,
such as banks or hedge funds always carry leverage. Note that in our model the capital
structure of the intermediary plays a central role in asset price determination. When the
intermediation constraint (5) binds, losses among intermediaries lead households to reduce
their equity exposure to these intermediaries. If the intermediaries scale down their asset
10We need to be careful in interpreting these numbers because there is some amount of double counting –
i.e. pension funds invest in hedge funds.
18Table 1: Intermediation Data ($ Billions) a
Group Assets Debt Debt/Assets
Commercial banks 11,800 10,401 0.88
S&L and Credit Unions 2,574 2,337 0.91
Property & Casualty Insurance 1,381 832 0.60
Life Insurance 4,950 4,662 0.94
Private Pensions 6,391 0 0.00
State & Local Ret Funds 3,216 0 0.00
Federal Ret Funds 1,197 0 0.00
Mutual Funds (excluding Money Funds) 7,829 0 0.00
Broker/Dealers 2,519 2,418 0.96
Hedge Funds 6,913 4,937 0.71
a
Most data are from the Flow of Funds March 2010 Level Tables, corresponding to the year 2007. The
broker/dealer and hedge fund total assets are as computed in He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010), who use data
from SEC ﬁlings for the broker/dealer sector and data from Barclay’s Hedge for the hedge fund sector. We assume
that the average broker/dealer runs a leverage of 25, based on Adrian and Shin (2010). We assume the average
hedge fund leverages up its capital base 3.5 times (taken from McGuire, Remolona and Tsatsaronis (2005))
holdings proportionately, the asset market will not clear – i.e. the intermediary sector’s
assets still have to be held in equilibrium. In the model, the equilibrium is one where the
[identical] intermediaries take on debt and hold a riskier position in the asset. Asset prices
are then set by the increased risk/leverage considerations of the intermediaries. In practice,
if households withdraw money from mutual funds, then mutual funds do not take on debt.
Rather, they reduce their holdings of ﬁnancial assets and some other entity buys their ﬁnancial
assets. In practice, the other entity may be a trading desk at a bank or a hedge fund that
temporarily providesliquidityto the mutual fund. It may be that the buyers have excess equity
capital in which case the purchase can occur without specialists having to increase their risk
exposure/leverage and therefore without equilibrium asset prices adjusting appreciably. This
situation corresponds to the unconstrained region of the model. However, if equity capital is
constrained, as in the model’s constrained region, then the purchase will be ﬁnanced by raising
debt, increasing leverage, and increasing risk concentration. In this case, asset prices will be
aﬀected and driven by the limited equity capital of the buyers (i.e. banks/hedge funds).
The m of the model parameterizes the equity capital constraint of the intermediaries. From
the discussion of the preceding paragraph, we see that to model asset price behavior we want
m to correspond to the equity capital constraints of banks/hedge funds rather than features
of the broad intermediary sector. This is because it is the marginal pricing condition of these
19intermediaries that is most relevant during a liquidation crisis.
We set m equal to 4, which matches both ownership data of banks and compensation data
from hedge funds. Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan (1999) report that the mean equity
ownership of oﬃcers and directors in the Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate sector was
17.4% in 1995. This translates to an m of 4.7(= 1−0.174
0.174 ). We also present an m = 8 case to
provide a sense as to the sensitivity of the results to the choice of m. Hedge fund contracts
typically pay the manager 20% of the fund’s return in excess of a benchmark, plus 1 − 2% of
funds under management (Fung and Hsieh, 2006). The choice of m dictates how much of the
return of the intermediary goes to the specialist ( 1
1+m) and how much go to equity investors
(
m
1+m). A value of m = 4 implies that the specialist’s share 1/5 = 20%. The 20% that is
common in hedge fund contracts is an option contract so it is not a full equity stake as in our
model, suggesting that perhaps we should use a larger value of m. However, to balance this,
note that the 1 − 2% fee is on funds under management and therefore grows as the fund is
successful and garners more inﬂows. We thus settle on a value of m = 4 as representative, in
a linear scheme, of the payoﬀ structure of the hedge fund.
4.2 Choice of λ
As noted above, m only plays a role in the constrained region of the model. In practice, we
can see from Table 1 that the intermediary sector always has some leverage, whether in a crisis
or not. It is important to match leverage in the unconstrained region because leverage aﬀects
how dividend shocks get magniﬁed and hence how the state transits from unconstrained to
constrained region.
We choose λ = 0.6 to match leverage in the unconstrained region. In this region, we
interpret the model’ssingle intermediaryas being an amalgam of all the intermediariesin Table
1. Within the model, when λ > 0 some households only demand debt, and the intermediaries
supply the debt and thereby achieve leverage even when intermediation is not constrained.
Across all of the intermediaries of Table 1, the Total Debt/Total Assets ratio is 0.52. Setting
λ = 0.6 in the model produces an average debt-to-asset ratio in the unconstrained region of
0.50, and an unconditional average debt-to-asset ratio of 0.55.
4.3 σ and g
We calibrate the intermediated asset to the market for mortgage-backed securities (MBS)
as a representative large intermediated asset class. The Securities Industry and Financial
20Markets Association (SIFMA) reports that the total outstanding MBS securities (Agency-
backed MBS, private-label MBS, commercial MBS) totaled $8.9tn in 2007. SIFMA reports
that the outstanding amount of asset-backed securities (auto, credit card, etc.) totaled $2.5tn
in 2007. We are unaware of data that allow us to know precisely who holds these securities.
However, the pattern of losses as reported by ﬁnancial institutions in the subprime crisis, and
most analyses of losses (e.g., see the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report of October 2008)
suggests these securities are mostly held in intermediary portfolios.
The Barclays Capital U.S. MBS Index (formerly the Lehman Brothers U.S. MBS index)
tracks the return on the universe of Agency-backed MBS from 1976 onwards. The annual
standard deviation of the excess return of this index over the Treasury bill rate, using data
from 1976 to 2008, is 8.1%. Note that this index measures the returns on Agency-backed MBS
which is the least risky (although largest) segment of the MBS market. As another benchmark,
the annual standard deviation of the excess return on Barclays index of commercial MBS over
the period 1999 (i.e. inception of the index) to 2008 is 9.6%.
We choose σ to be 9%. With this choice, the standard deviation of the excess return on
the intermediated asset in our model is 9.2%. This number is in the range between the low
risk Agency MBS and the higher risk commercial MBS. 11
We choose g = 1.84%. We would expect that the payouts on mortgage assets should grow
11Our choice of σ = 9% is an order of magnitude higher than aggregate consumption volatility of close
to 3%. In standard general equilibrium approaches to asset pricing, exempliﬁed by Campbell and Cochrane
(1999) or Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), models assume a representative agent whose consumption is
equal to NIPA aggregate consumption and price a payoﬀ with a dividend stream that matches properties of
aggregate stock market dividends.
The marginal investor in our model is the specialist-intermediary rather than a representative agent because
intermediaries are not a veil. As our analysis shows, the specialist’s marginal utility is endogenously aﬀected by
ﬂuctuations in the value of assets that the specialist holds. Thus, we do not exogenously specify the marginal
investor’s consumption process based on aggregate consumption, but endogenously derive the joint behavior
of specialist consumption and the prices of intermediated assets. For this reason, we choose the volatility
of the risky asset’s dividends to match those of ﬁnancial payoﬀs rather than that of aggregate consumption.
Indeed, we see the endogenous relationship between ﬁnancial wealth ﬂuctuations and the pricing kernel as an
important reason to model intermediaries rather than treat them as a veil.
Finally, in principle it seems possible to reconcile the low aggregate consumption volatility we observe in
practice with the 9% dividend volatility of the model by assuming that the household sector has income from
other assets (i.e stock market dividends) and labor income, and that this income is weakly correlated with the
returns from mortgage-backed securities. Unfortunately, such a model will no longer be homogeneous with
respect to Dt which will considerably complicate the analysis.
21with the economy. We set g based on the growth of dividends in the stock market, taking such
growth to reﬂect the general rate of cash-ﬂow growth in the economy. The choice of g has a
minor eﬀect on results. On the other hand, σ is critical because it is closely related to the
amount of risk borne by the specialist and the volatility of the intermediary pricing kernel.
Table 2: Parameters
Panel A: Intermediation
m Intermediation multiplier 4
λ Debt ratio 0.6
Panel B: Preferences and Cashﬂows
g Dividend growth 1.84%
σ Dividend volatility 9%
ρ Time discount rate 5%
γ RRA of specialist 2
l Household labor income ratio 1.3
4.4 γ, l, and ρ
We choose γ = 2 as risk aversion of the specialist. This choice of γ produces an average excess
return on the intermediated asset of 3.4%. Over the 1976 to 2008 period, the average excess
return on the Barclay’s Agency MBS index was 2.6%. Over the 1999 to 2008 period, the
return on the commercial MBS index was 0.32%. However, the latter sample is quite short
and heavily weighted by a large -22.9% return in 2008. Note also that allowing for γ > 1 for
the specialist allows us to capture dynamic hedging eﬀects that would be absent if set the
specialist to have log preferences to match with the household.
We choose l to match the income proﬁle of a typical household. In our model, households
receive expected capital and dividend income of E
h
wtrtdt + (1 − λ)αh
t
￿
f dRt − rtdt
￿i
and ex-
pected labor income of E[lDtdt]. We set l = 1.3 which produces a capital income to total
income share of 33.7%. Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) report that the average capital
income to total income for households over the period from 1982 to 2006 was 32%.
We choose ρ = 0.05. This choice produces an average riskless interest rate of 0.62%, which
is in the range of typical numbers in the literature. Finally, our parameter choices are also




1+l > 0. This restriction is necessary
to ensure that the economy is well-behaved at t = ∞ (see Appendix A).
224.5 Numerical method
We present numerical solutions based on the calibration of Table 2. We use one of MATLAB’s
built-in ODE solvers to derive solutions for F(y),µy, and σy. Further details are provided in
the Appendix A.
With these solutions in hand, we numerically simulate the model to obtain the steady
state distribution of the state variable y as well as a number of asset price measurements
that we report in the next sections. We begin the economy at a state (y0 = yc,D0 = 1) and
simulate the economy for 5000 years. That is we obtain a sequence of independent draws from
the normal distribution and use these draws to represent innovations in our shock process
Zt. The path of Zt can then be mapped into a path of the state variable. We compute the
time-series averages of a number of relevant asset price measurements from years 1000 to 5000
of this sample. The simulation unit is monthly, and based on those monthly observations
we compute annual averages. We repeat this exercise 5000 times, averaging across all of the
simulated Zt paths. We ﬁnd that changing the starting value y0 does not aﬀect the computed
distribution or any of the asset price measurements, indicating that the distribution truly
represents the steady state distribution of the economy.
5 Crisis Behavior
5.1 Risk Premium and Sharpe Ratio
Figure 2 graphs the risk premium and Sharpe ratio for the calibration of Table 2 as a function
of the specialist wealth relative to the value of the risky asset (w/P). The latter ratio can
be interpreted as the inside capital of the intermediation sector as a percentage of the assets
held by the intermediation sector. Even though we solve our model based on the household’s
scaled wealth y = wh/D, we decide to illustrate our results using w/P in order to more clearly
discuss the role of intermediation capital.
The prominent feature of our model, clearly illustrated by the graphs, is the asymmetric
behavior of the risk premium and Sharpe ratio. The right hand side of the graphs represent
the unconstrained states of the economy, while the left hand side represent the constrained
states. The cutoﬀ for the constrained region in the ﬁgures is 0.091. In words, the constrained
region arises when specialists own [less than] equity equivalent to 9.1% of the assets held by
intermediaries. Note that this number refers to the equity ownership of the entire interme-
23Figure 2: Risk Premium and Sharpe Ratio























Risk premium (left panel) and Sharpe ratio (right panel) are graphed against w/P, the specialist
wealth as a percentage of the assets held by the intermediation sector. Parameters are those given
in Table 2.
diation sector; there may be some sectors where the specialists own far less than 9.1%, and
some where the specialists own more. Risk premia and Sharpe ratio rise as specialist wealth
falls in the constrained region, while being relatively constant in the unconstrained region.
This asymmetric behavior is intuitivelywhat one would expect from the model: the model’s
intermediation constraint is by its nature asymmetric, and binding only when specialist wealth
is low. To sharpen understanding of the mapping between the constraint and risk premia,
consider the following calculation. As noted above, the pricing kernel in our model can be








To a ﬁrst-order approximation, the volatility of the specialist’s consumption growth is equal














t is the portfolio exposure to the risky asset in the intermediary’s (and specialist’s)








24In our model, the variance of returns is roughly constant as a function of state (see the
discussion of this point below). Most of the action in the risk premium comes from the
changing αI
t. We have noted before that in the constrained region, as households withdraw
from intermediaries and limit their participation in the risky asset market, the specialists
increase their exposure to the risky asset (see equation (18)). This dynamic, driven through
αI
t, explains the behavior of the risk premium. Figure 3 graphs αI. We note the close
correspondence between this graph and those in Figure 2.
Figure 3: Portfolio Holdings













The intermediary’s portfolio share in the risky asset (αI) is graphed
against w/P.
An interesting point of comparison for our results is to the literature on state-dependent
risk premia, notably, Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001),
and Kyle and Xiong (2001). In these models, as in ours, the risk premium is increasing in
the adversity of the state. Campbell and Cochrane and Barberis, Huang, and Santos modify
the utility function of a representative investor to exhibit state-dependent risk aversion. We
work with a standard CRRA utility function, but generate state dependence endogenously as
a function of the frictions in the economy. For empirical work, our approach suggests that
measures of intermediary capital/capacity will help to explain risk premia. In this regard, our
model is closer in spirit to Kyle and Xiong who generate a risk premium that is a function
of “arbitrageur” wealth. The main theoretical diﬀerence between Kyle and Xiong and our
25model is that the wealth eﬀect in their model comes from assuming that the arbitrageur has
log utility, while in our model it comes because the intermediation constraint is a function of
intermediary capital. For empirical work, our model suggests that measures of intermediary
capital will explain risk premia. One notable distinction of our model is the sharp asymmetry
of our model’s risk premia: a muted dependence on capital in the unconstrained region and a
strong dependence in the constrained region. In Kyle and Xiong, the log utility assumption
delivers a risk premium that is a much smoother function of arbitrageur wealth. Plausibly, to
explain a crisis episode, one needs the type of asymmetry delivered by our model.
5.2 Discussion: Leverage and Heterogeneity
Figure 3 also shows that the rise in the risk premium in the constrained region is closely
related to the rise in leverage of the intermediary sector. In practice, many intermediary
sectors during a crisis reduce leverage, while other sectors increase leverage. As with our
earlier discussion of calibration, there is heterogeneity within the intermediation sector that
our single intermediary model cannot capture. Adrian and Shin (2010) document that the
leverage of the broker/dealer sector is procyclical, suggesting that it falls during recessions
and crises. He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) document that in the period from the
fourth quarter of 2007 to the ﬁrst quarter of 2009, spanning the worst episode of the subprime
crisis, the hedge fund and broker/dealer sector shed assets, consistent with the deleveraging
evidence of Adrian and Shin as well as theoretical papers modeling leverage constraints (see
Gromb and Vayanos, 2002, Geanokoplos and Fostel, 2008, and Brunnemeier and Pedersen,
2008). He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy show that the commercial banking sector increased
asset holdings over this period signiﬁcantly. Moreoever, the leverage of the top 19 commercial
banks sector rises from 10.4 at the end of 2007 to near 30 at the start of 2009. He, Khang, and
Krishnamurthy suggest that the diﬀerential behavior of the commercial banking sector vis-a-
vis the hedge fund sector is that the former had access to government-backed debt ﬁnancing,
which aided their leverage growth. The diﬀerential behavior of the banking sector in 2008 is
reﬂective of a broader pattern of reintermediation during ﬁnancial downturns, as documented
by Gatev and Strahan (2006) and Pennacchi (2006). Importantly for the present analysis, in
accord with our model the intermediaries that are the buyers during the crisis (i.e. banks) do
so by borrowing and increasing leverage. Our model does not capture the other aspect of this
process, as reﬂected in the behavior of the hedge fund and broker/dealer sector, that other
parts of the ﬁnancial sector reduce asset holdings and leverage. It would be interesting to
26build a model with heterogeneity within the intermediary sector to more fully address these
patterns.
5.3 Steady State Risk Premia
Quantitatively, as one can read from Figure 2, the calibration produces an average risk pre-
mium in the unconstrained region of approximately 3%. The numbers for the risk premium
are higher in the constrained region; however, without knowing the probability that a given
specialist-wealth state may occur, it is not possible to interpret a statement about how much
higher. To provide some sense for the values of the risk premium we may be likely to observe
in practice, we simulate the model as described in Section 4.5 and compute the equilibrium
probability of each state. The resulting steady state distribution over the specialist wealth
as a percentage of the assets held by the intermediation sector (w/P) is graphed in Figure 4.
Also superimposed on the ﬁgure in a dashed line is the risk premium from the previous graph.
Figure 4: Steady State Distribution


















The steady state distribution of w/P is graphed. The vertical line gives the state where the inter-
mediation constraint starts binding (w/P = 0.091). The dashed line graphs the risk premium in
order to illustrate the actual range of variation of the risk premium. Risk premium is indicated on
the left scale, while the distribution is indicated on the right scale.
There are two forces driving the center-peaked distribution in Figure 4. First, as w/P
falls, the risk premium rises. This in turn means that the specialist, who is holding a levered
position in the risky asset, increases his wealth on average. This force is stronger as the risk
27premium rises, which is why the distribution places almost no weight on risk premia as high
as 30%. At the other end, when w/P is large so that wh is small, the households are poor
and consuming little but still receive labor income. Thus, their wealth grows as they save the
labor income, which shifts the wealth distribution back towards the constrained region.
Table 3: Measurements
Panel A: Constrained and Unconstrained Regions
We present average measurements for the economy, broken down into conditional on being in
the constrained region, conditional on being in the unconstrained region, and unconditional
average. Parameters are as given in Table 2. We also include a case for m = 8.
m = 4 Case m = 8 Case
Avg. Unc. Const. Avg. Unc. Const.
Probability 64.45 33.55 80.39 19.61
Risk Premium (%) 3.41 3.14 3.99 3.43 3.28 4.07
Sharpe Ratio (%) 36.95 33.79 43.19 37.34 35.57 44.64
Interest Rate (%) 0.62 0.87 0.12 0.58 0.72 0.00
Debt/Assets Ratio (%) 55.29 50.26 65.24 54.86 51.89 67.08
Income Ratio (%) 33.72 26.80 38.09 37.35 31.42 38.87
Panel B: Measures at Diﬀerent Risk Premia
The second row reports the probability that the economy will ever reach a value of risk
premium greater than the given π. The rest of the rows report measures at the given π.
m = 4 m = 8
Risk Premium (%) ≡ π 3% 6% 9% 12% 3% 6% 9% 12%
Prob (Risk Premium> π) 93.93 1.58 0.26 0.08 94.55 1.01 0.17 0.06
Sharpe Ratio at π 31.89 65.46 101.46 140.67 31.88 65.95 100.89 136.95
Interest Rate at π 0.96 -1.77 -4.79 -8.05 0.95 -1.86 -4.89 -7.99
Debt/Assets Ratio at π 44.00 81.96 89.76 93.19 43.30 82.26 89.58 92.76
Table 3 provides further information on the range of variation of the state variable. Fo-
cusing on Panel A (m = 4 case), the economy spends 66.45% of the time in the unconstrained
region. We may think of the unconstrained region as a “normal” non-crisis period. The av-
erage risk premium and Sharpe ratio, conditional on being in the unconstrained region, is
3.14% and 33.89, respectively (Panel A). In the constrained region, the risk premium rises to
average 3.99%. The probability that the risk premium will exceed 6% is 1.58%. For the risk
premium to exceed 9%, which is about triple the unconstrained region average in terms of
both risk premium and Sharpe ratio, the probability is 0.26% (Panel B). An extreme crisis
that increases risk premia and Sharpe ratio about 4X to 12% is very unlikely, in keeping with
the historical record. Our model puts this probability at 0.08%.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The left panel graphs the spreads between the Moody’s index of AAA corporate bonds and the
10 year Treasury rate (grey line, “credit”), the spreads between FNMA 6% TBA mortgage-backed
securities and the 10 year Treasury rate (black line, “MBS”), and the option-adjusted spreads on
a portfolio of interest-only mortgage-backed securities relative to Treasury bonds (dashed line, “IO
OAS”) from 1997 to 1999. The right panel graphs the same credit spread as well as the OAS on the
FNMA 6% MBS from 2007 to 2009.
To put the numbers from Table 3 in perspective, consider the 1998 crisis and the 2008
subprime crisis. Figure 5, left-panel graphs the behavior of the high grade credit spread
(AAA bonds minus Treasuries), the spread on FNMA mortgage backed securities relative
to Treasuries, and the option adjusted spread on volatile interest-only mortgage derivative
securities (data are from Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron, 2007). The spreads are
graphed over a period from 1997 to 1999 and includes the fall of 1998 hedge fund crisis.
During 1997 and upto the middle of 1998 spreads move in a fairly narrow range. If we
interpret the unconstrained states of our model as this “normal” period, then the muted
response of risk premia to the state can capture this pre-crisis period. In a short period
around October 1998 spreads on these securities increase sharply. The credit spreads and
MBS spreads double from their pre-crisis level. The mortgage derivative spread increases by
many multiples. The right-panel graphs the credit spread and the FNMA mortgage spread
from 2007 to 2009. The subprime crisis begins in the summer of 2007, escalating until the fall
of 2008. From the pre-crisis period to the fall of 2008, the MBS spread quadruples, while the
credit spread rises six-fold. It is hard to say precisely how much Sharpe ratios increase during
these episodes, because the underlying default risk in these bonds is also increasing. However,
29a doubling or tripling is plausibly within the range of estimates. Our simulations suggest that
the probability of the risk premium tripling from a normal level is 0.26%, indicating these
crises are rare events. Moreover, from the standpoint of standard representative household
asset pricing models, even a modest increase in risk premia during the 1998 event is diﬃcult to
understand as aggregate consumption was barely at risk. In our model, the asymmetry in the
intermediation constraint calibrated to hedge fund data can generate the dramatic increase in
risk premia around crises.
The table also presents an m = 8 case to gauge the sensitivity of the calibration to the
choice of m, which is perhaps the hardest parameter to conﬁdently pin down. The larger m
leads to a smaller constrained region (“constraints” eﬀect). The probability of falling into
the constrained region is 19.61% for this case, compared to 33.54% for the m = 4 case. As
discussed in Section 3.4, when m is larger the specialist is able to raise more external capital
based on any given level of his own wealth. Thus his wealth has to be lower in order to fall
into the constrained region. On the other hand, the risk premium in the constrained and
unconstrained regions are higher in the m = 8 case. More generally, the higher m case also
displays a “sensitivity” eﬀect. When m is higher a $1 fall in specialist wealth leads to an $m
reduction in household contributions to the intermediary, creating a sharper rise of the risk
premium for any given specialist wealth. The two eﬀects of changing m roughly cancel out:
risk premia are conditionally higher in the m = 8 case, but the economy is also less likely to
fall into the constrained region.
5.4 Flight to quality
The row in Table 3, Panel A corresponding to the interest rate shows that the interest rate
falls from an average of 0.62% in the unconstrained region to 0.12% in the constrained region.
There are two intuitions behind this fall in interest rates. First, as the specialist’s consumption
volatility rises with the tightness of the intermediation constraint, the precautionary savings
eﬀect increases specialist demand for the riskless bond. Second, as specialist wealth falls,
households withdraw equity from intermediaries, increasing their demand for the risklessbond.
To clear the bond market, the equilibrium interest rate has to fall. Both the behavior of the
interest rate and the disintermediation-driven demand for bonds is consistent with a ﬂight to
quality.
However, we can also see from the table that the interest rate is over-sensitive to the state
in our model. At the 6% risk premium state, the interest rate is around −1.77%, falling to
30−4.79% at the 9% risk premium state (for the m = 4 case).
The main reason for this over-sensitive interest rate is that we are pushing the general
equilibrium of our model too far. Our model-economy consists of only an intermediation
sector and therefore ascribes all movements in interest rates to shocks within that sector. In
practice, part of the demand for bonds in the economy is from sectors that are unaﬀected
by the intermediation constraint, so that it is likely that our model overstates the interest
rate eﬀect. However, it also does not seem appropriate to ﬁx the interest rate exogenously,
since interest rates do fall during a crisis episode. Thus, while the qualitative prediction of
our model for interest rates seems correct, the quantitative implications are the least credible
results of our analysis.
5.5 Price/Dividend Ratio and Volatility
Figure 6: P/D Ratio and Volatility


























Price/Dividend ratio (left panel) and risky asset return volatility (right panel) are graphed against
the specialist wealth as a percentage of the assets held by the intermediation sector (w/P). Param-
eters are given in Table 2.
The left-hand panel of Figure 6 graphs the price/dividend ratio F(·) against w/P. Con-
sistent with intuition, over most of the range, F(·) falls as specialist wealth falls. There is a
non-monotonicity that arises when the specialist wealth is very small – although this occurs
for values of w/P for which the steady state distribution places very little weight (see Figure
4). The non-monotonicity arises because interest rates diverge to negative inﬁnity when the
specialist wealth approaches zero. There are two forces aﬀecting the discount rates applied to
31dividends in determining F(·): On the one hand, the risk premium is high when the specialist
wealth is low; on the other hand, the interest rate is low for higher specialist wealth. These
two eﬀects combine to produce the non-monotonicity of F(·).
The right-hand panel of Figure 6 gives the pattern of the risky asset return volatility when
the specialist wealth varies. Over most of the relevant range of variation of the state variable,
the volatility is constant between 9% and 9.5%. In particular, the model fails to replicate the
observed increase in conditional volatility accompanying a crisis period.
The non-monotonicity in F(·) also causes volatility to fall in the region where w/P ap-
proaches zero. The risky asset price is equal to Dt ×F(wt/Pt). The non-monotonicity means
that a shock that causes a fall in Dt leads to a rise in F (since wt/Pt decreases as Dt falls,
and F 0(·) < 0). We stress again that the steady state distribution places almost no weight on
these small values of w/P.
5.6 Capital movement and recovery from crisis
Referring to Figure 5, left-panel, the corporate bond spread and MBS spread widen from 90
bps in July 1998 to a high of 180 bps in October 1998 before coming down to 130 bps in
June 1999. Thus, the half-life — that is, the time it takes the spread to fall halfway to the
pre-crisis level — is about 10 months. The interest-only mortgage derivative spread, which is
very sensitive to market conditions, widens from 250 bps in July 1998 to a high of 2000 bps
before coming back to 500 bps in June 1999. In the right-panel, the MBS spread recovers
back to its pre-crisis level by June 2009, while the credit spread remains elevated through the
end of the period. We note that this timescale for mean reversion, on the order of months,
is much slower than the daily mean-reversion patterns commonly addressed in the market
micro-structure literature (e.g., Campbell, Grossman, and Wang, 1994).
A common wisdom among many observers is that this pattern of recovery reﬂects the
slow movement of capital into the aﬀected markets (Froot and O’Connell, 1999, Berndt, et.
al., 2004, Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino, 2007, Duﬃe and Strulovici, 2009). Our model
captures this slow movement. We will show in this section that our baseline calibration can
also replicate these speeds of capital movement.
In the crisis states of our model, risk premia are high and the specialists hold leveraged
positions on the risky asset. Over time, proﬁts from this position increase wt, thereby in-
creasing the capital base of the intermediaries. The increase in specialist capital is mirrored
by an m-fold increase in the allocation of households’ capital to the intermediaries, as the
32intermediation constraint is relaxed. Together these forces reﬂect a movement of capital back
into the risky asset market and lead to increased risk-bearing capacity and lower risk premia.
Note, however, that one dimension of capital movement that plausibly occurs in practice but
is not captured by our model is the entry of “new” specialists into the risky asset market.
We can use the model simulation to gauge the length and severity of a crisis within our
model. Table 4 presents data on how long it takes to recover from a crisis in our model. We
ﬁx a state (y,D) corresponding to an instantaneous risk premium in the “Transit from” row.
Simulating the model from that initial condition, we compute and report the ﬁrst passage
time that the state hits the risk premium corresponding to the “Transit to” column. The time
is reported in years.
Table 4: Crisis Recovery
This table presents transition time data from simulating the model. We ﬁx a state
corresponding to an instantaneous risk premium of 12% (“Transit from”). Simulating
the model from that initial condition, we compute and report the ﬁrst passage time
that the state hits the risk premium corresponding to that in the “Transit to” column.
Time is reported in years. The column “Increment time” reports the time between
incremental “Transit to” rows.
Transit to 10 7.5 6 5 4 3.5
Transit time from 12 0.17 0.66 1.49 2.72 5.88 9.84
Increment time 0.17 0.49 0.83 1.24 3.15 3.97
If we start from the extreme crisis state of 12% and compute how long it takes to recover
to 7.5% — i.e. halfway back to the unconditional average levels we report earlier of around 3%
— the time is 0.66 years (7.9 months). From the 10% crisis state to the 6.5% state (halfway to
3%) takes 0.93 years (this number is not reported in the table). For the fall of 1998 episode,
the half-life we suggested was around 10 months. The model half-life from 10% is of the same
order of magnitude of the empirical observation.
The slow adjustment of risk premia, in timescales of many months, during the 1998 episode
is also consistent with other studies of crisis episodes. Berndt, et. al. (2005) study the credit
default swap market from 2000 to 2004 and note a dramatic market-wide increase in risk
premia (roughly a quadrupling) in July 2002 (see Figures 1 and 2 of the paper). Risk premia
gradually fall over the next two years: From the peak in July 2002, risk premia halve by
April 2003 (9 months). The authors argue that dislocations beginning with the Enron crisis
led to a decrease in risk-bearing capacity among corporate bond investors. Mirroring the
decreasing risk-bearing capacity, risk premia rose before slowly falling as capital moved back
33into the corporate bond market and expanded risk bearing capacity. Gabaix, Krishnamurthy,
and Vigneron (2007) note a dislocation in the mortgage-backed securities in late 1993 trig-
gered by an unexpected wave of consumer prepayments. A number of important hedge fund
players suﬀered losses and went out of business during this period, leading to a reduction in
risk bearing capacity. Figure 3 in the paper documents that risk premia reached a peak in
December 1993 before halving by April 1994 (5 months). Froot and O’Connell (1999) study
the catastrophe insurance market and demonstrate similar phenomena. When insurers suﬀer
losses that deplete capital they raise the price of catastrophe insurance. Prices then gradually
fall back to long-run levels as capital moves back into the catastrophe insurance market. Froot
and O’Connell show that the half-life in terms of prices can be well over a year.12
Each of these markets are intermediated markets that ﬁt our model well. Investors are
institutions who have specialized expertise in assessing risk in their markets. Our theory
explains the slow movement of risk bearing capacity and risk premia documented in these
case-studies. The calibrated model also captures the frequency of the slow adjustment of risk
premia.
6 Crisis Policy Experiments
We study the eﬀect of policy interventions in the crisis of the model. We study three policies:
(1) Lowering borrowing rates to the intermediary, as with a decrease in the central bank’s
discount rate; (2) Direct purchase of the risky asset by the government, ﬁnanced by debt
issuance and taxation of households; and,(3) Infusing equity capital into the intermediaries
during a crisis. These three policies are chosen because they are among those undertaken by
central banks in practice. Our aim is to quantify the eﬀects of these policies on the equilibrium
of our model. The analysis is purely positive, and we make no claims as to optimality.
Our policy experiments correspond to the following exercise. Suppose we are in a crisis
state currently, with a given asset/liability position for the households and specialists. From
this initial condition, suppose that the government conducts a policy that was not anticipated
by the agents. We trace the eﬀects of this policy on the recovery of the economy from that
12Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007) document similar eﬀects in the convertible bond market in 1998
and again in 2005. In both cases, crisis recovery times are in the order of months. They also note that spreads
in merger arbitrage strategies took several months to recover following the October 1987 risky asset-market
crash.
34crisis state.13
To be more precise, we compute two equilibria, one with the policy and one without the
policy. For example, the ﬁrst policy we consider is a borrowing subsidy that is given to
intermediaries as long as the economy is in the constrained region. We write the subsidy as
a function of the primitive state variables and solve the equilibrium of the model under such
a policy. We then suppose that the economy is currently in a given crisis state of the no-
policy equilibrum (12% risk premium state in the simulations), characterized by the portfolio
positions of the households and the specialists. The government policy enacted in this state
causes asset prices to jump because the policy is unanticipated. From that point on, the
dynamics of the economy are described by the solution to our model under the with-policy
equilibrium.14
6.1 Borrowing Subsidy
During ﬁnancial crises, the central bank lowers its discount rate and its target for the overnight
interbank interest rate. Financial intermediaries rely heavily on rolling over one-day loans
for their operation (see, for example, Adrian and Shin (2010) on the overnight repurchase
market). Because of this dependence, intermediaries are perhaps the most sensitive sector
within the economy to overnight interest rates. Commercial and investment banks have access
to overnight funds at the discount window of the central bank. Thus, to the extent that the
central bank lowers overnight rates, including the discount rate, it reduces the borrowing costs
of ﬁnancial intermediaries.
While our model does not have a monetary side within which to analyze how a central bank
alters the equilibriumovernight interest rate, we can go some way towards examining the eﬀect
of this policy by studying the following transfer. The debt position of intermediaries at date
t is (αI
t −1)wt. Suppose that the government makes a lumpsum transfer of ∆r ×(αI
t −1)wtdt
from households to intermediaries, where ∆r measures the size of the transfer. The transfer
13The government policy is a zero-probability event in our exercise. Another experiment would be to study
a policy that is expected to be enacted given some value of the state variable – say the government infuses
equity capital if the risk premium touches 12%. Such a policy would be anticipated by agents within the
equilibrium of the model. Analyzing such a policy does not pose any diﬃculty for our modeling structure,
but it adds an extra layer of complexity to the model. For the sake of brevity, we have opted to focus on the
simpler experiment.
14The initial condition from which we simulate the with-policy equilibrium is chosen so that it matches the
portfolio holdings of the household in the 12% risk premium state of the no-policy equilibrium.
35is proportional to the debt of the intermediary.
The subsidy experiment can be thought of as a reduction in the central bank’s discount
rate. In practice, when the central bank makes funds available more cheaply to the ﬁnancial
sector through the discount window it is transferring real resources from taxpaying households
to the ﬁnancial sector. However, since our model is cast in real terms, the subsidy is only a
stand-in for a reduction in something like the overnight Federal Funds rate.
Formally, we examine an equilibrium where ∆r is paid only if w > wc. For w < wc there
is no subsidy. We express this transfer of ∆r × (αI
t − 1)wtdt in terms of the primitive state
variables yt and Dt. Then, the dynamic budget constraints of household and specialist are
altered to account for the transfer (see equation 10), and this change is traced through to
rederive the ODE for the price/dividend ratio (see Appendix C for details).
Table 5: Borrowing Subsidy
This table presents transition time data from simulating the
model. We begin in the 12% risk premium state and report
the ﬁrst passage time for the state to reach that in the ﬁrst
column of the table (“Transit to” column). Time is reported
in years. We report the case of no subsidy (∆r = 0), as
well as subsidies of 0.01,0.02 and 0.045. A subsidy of 0.01
corresponds to 100 bps. The ﬁrst row of the table reports the
instantaneous jump downwards in the risk premium when the
government initiates the policy.
Transit to ∆r = 0 ∆r = 0.01 ∆r = 0.02 ∆r = 0.045
11.05% 10.11% 8.38%
10 0.17 0.10 0.03
7.50 0.66 0.48 0.34 0.12
6 1.49 1.08 0.79 0.40
5 2.72 1.94 1.43 0.75
4 5.88 4.02 2.81 1.36
Table 5 presents the results. We start the economy in the state corresponding to the 12%
risk premium. The subsidy of ∆r is provided to the intermediaries as long as the economy is
in the constrained region. The table reports the recovery times from the 12% extreme crisis
state for diﬀerent levels of ∆r. Consistent with intuition, a higher subsidy speeds up the
recovery process. The 200 bps subsidy speeds up the recovery to 7.5% by 0.32 years. Note
that from August 2007 to October 2008, the discount rate decreased by 450 bps. The last
column in the table indicates the eﬀect of this policy within our model. Figure 7 presents the
36data graphically.
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The ﬁgure describes the path of recovery, measured in terms of risk premium,
to a shock that moves the economy at t = 0 to the 12% risk premium state.
The recovery path is drawn for diﬀerent levels of borrowing subsidy given to
intermediaries. The horizontal line indicates the unconstrained average risk
premium of 3.14%.
6.2 Direct Asset Purchase
In both the subprime crisis as well as the Great Depression the government directly entered
the asset market to purchase distressed assets. The Federal Reserve and GSEs purchased
nearly $1.8tn of mortgage-backed securities over the period from August 2007 to August 2009
($1.25tn by the Federal Reserve and $550bn by the GSEs). We can evaluate the impact of this
policy as follows. Suppose that the government purchases a fraction s the risky asset in states
w < wc, ﬁnancing this purchase by issuing sP of instantaneous debt (where P is the price of
the risky asset). The cash-ﬂow, after repaying debt, from this transaction is sP(dRt − rtdt)..
We assume that the government raises lumpsum taxes from (or rebates to) the households to
balance this cash-ﬂow.
Table 5 reports the results for three values of s, which is the share of the intermediated
risky asset market that the government purchases. If we take the stock of intermediated assets
to be $15tn, then the $1.8tn number cited above is 12% of this stock. We assume that the
37policy is initiated in the state corresponding to 12% risk premium and not removed until the
economy is in the unconstrained region. We trace the recovery path from this state.
Table 6: Asset Purchase
This table presents transition time data from simulating the
model. We begin in the 12% risk premium state and report the
ﬁrst passage time for the state to reach that in the ﬁrst column of
the table (“Transit to” column). Time is reported in years. We
report the case of no purchase (s = 0), as well as purchases of
0.04,0.08, and 0.12. A purchase with s = 0.04 corresponds to the
government buying 4% of the outstanding stock of intermediated
risky assets. The ﬁrst row of the table reports the instantaneous
jump downwards in the risk premium when the government be-
gins its purchase.
Transit to s = 0 s = 0.04 s = 0.08 s = 0.12
11.63% 11.18% 10.77%
10 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.10
7.50 0.66 0.68 0.63 0.58
6 1.49 1.47 1.44 1.40
5 2.72 2.70 2.64 2.56
4 5.88 5.87 5.81 5.63
The policy causes a downward jump in the risk premium. The asset purchase policy
indirectly increases the household’s exposure to the risky asset because future taxes now
depend on the returns to the risky asset. In turn, this means that specialists bear less risk
in equilibrium and hence the risk premium falls. Eﬀectively this policy puts less risk on the
limited risk-bearing capacity of the intermediary sector. After this initial jump the recovery
path is almost the same as the case of no intervention. For example, if we compare the
incremental time it takes the economy to move from 7.5% to 6%, we see that the time for the
no intervention case is 0.83 years, while it is 0.82 years for the case of s = 0.12. Intuitively
the purchase has no further eﬀect because there is a countervailing force: the specialist holds
a smaller position in the risky asset (since the taxpayer holds a larger share) and hence less
of the risk premium accrues to it, which causes intermediary capital to recover more slowly.
6.3 Capital infusion
A number of crisis interventions are aimed at increasing the equity capital of intermediaries.
For example, in the Great Depression, the government directly acquired preferred shares in
38banks, thereby increasing their equity capital. In the subprime crisis, the U.S. Treasury
purchased $205 bn of preferred shares in the intermediary sector through the capital purchase
program.
We examine an equilibrium in which m is increased to ¯ m > 4 in a crisis, deﬁned as states
where w < w∗, or equivalently y > y∗. The higher m indicates that the intermediary increases
its equity capital proportionate to ¯ m − m. The extra equity capital is purchased by the
government, and paid for by lumpsum taxes on the households. Returns on the government
investment are rebated in a lumpsum fashion to the households. We think of the increase in
m as a temporary relaxation of the equity capital constraint. For example, one may imagine
that the government is temporarily able to monitor intermediaries better than households
during a crisis and can thus relax the capital constraint. Our aim is to quantify the eﬀect of
the relaxation of the constraint on the crisis recovery.
To evaluate the Treasury’s policy with our model, we need to choose ¯ m and w∗. As with
the asset purchase policy, we express the policy formally in terms of y. We set y∗ equal to
yc, so that the policy is reversed when the economy enters the unconstrained region. For
technical reasons, to avoid a discontinuity in m, we increase m from to ¯ m over an interval
from y∗ to y∗ + 0.22, where 0.22 is the drift of y around y∗ in the new equilibrium. Our aim
here is to implement the policy to last 1 year from the time at which it is initiated, matching
the duration of the stimulus we have observed in practice. Our results are not sensitive to the
choice of 0.22.
We choose ¯ m to represent the Treasury’s purchase of $205 bn of bank capital. Note
that capital in our model refers to common shares, while in practice, the Treasury purchased
preferred shares. The distinction is important because our model works through the sharing
of risk between the specialist and the household/government, rather than directly through
the amount of funds that are transferred to the intermediary sector. When the government
invests in the intermediary and shares some of the risk in the specialist’s investment, then
the specialist bears less risk in equilibrium and the risk premium adjusts downwards. The
returns on common shares are more sensitive to the returns on intermediary investment than
are the returns on preferred shares, indicating that common shares allow for more risk sharing
than preferred shares. Franks and Torous (1994), based on a sample of distressed ﬁrms over
the period 1983 to 1988, document that in a bankruptcy/reorganization, preferred shares are
repaid 42% of face value. In our model, the value of common shares approaches zero as the
value of assets falls towards the value of liabilities (the bankruptcy threshold). Likewise, as
the value of assets rises, preferred shares received a relatively ﬁxed dividend, while the value
39of common shares increases. We translate the preferred share purchase in terms of common
shares using the 42% number of Franks and Torous. We assume that an injection of $1 of
preferred shares is equal to an injection of $0.58 (= 1 − 0.42)of common shares.
The Treasury’s capital injection was distributed across many banks, from pure lending
institutions to trading institutions. Since our model is primarily about securities markets
and trading institutions, we apportion the $205 bn capital to reﬂect the injection of capital to
support securities trading. We multiply the injection by 0.40, which is the fraction of securities
in total bank assets, as computed from the Flow of Funds 2007 data. We thus evaluate the
eﬀect in our model of raising m to ¯ m in the crisis states, where ¯ m is chosen so that the implied
increase in equity capital (as fraction of total assets under intermediation) in the 12% crisis
state is $48 bn (=205 × 0.58 × 0.40) divided by $15 tn. We also present results for a $38 bn
and $58 bn equity injection. The results are in Table 7.
Table 7: Equity Injection
This table presents transition time data from simulating the
model. We begin in the 12% risk premium state and report the
ﬁrst passage time for the state to reach that in the ﬁrst column of
the table (“Transit to” column). Time is reported in years. We
report the case of a purchase of equity capital of $38 bn, $48 bn
and $58 bn, which is reversed in roughly one year. The ﬁrst row
of the table reports the instantaneous jump downwards in the risk
premium when the government injects the equity capital.
Transit to Baseline $38bn $48bn $58bn
9.12% 8.67% 8.28%
7.50 1.09 0.39 0.31 0.23
6 1.49 1.14 1.05 0.96
5 2.72 2.33 2.20 2.10
4 5.88 5.13 5.06 4.98
The eﬀects of policy are qualitatively similar to the other cases: there is a jump downwards
in the risk premium and a gradual adjustment afterwards. It is most interesting to compare
the eﬀects of the three policies. Compared to the asset purchase case, we see that a relatively
small amount of funds used towards equity purchase produces a much faster recovery. The
reason that the equity injection has such a large eﬀect is because the fundamental friction in
our model is an equity capital constraint. The equity capital injection of $48 bn, corresponding
to the actually policy enacted in 2008/2008, leads to a recovery time to the 6% state of 1.05
years. The 450 basis point borrowing subsidy, corresponding to actual policy, leads to the
40fastest recovery time of of 0.40 years. This policy has a large eﬀect because the intermediaries
are very leveraged in our model, carrying a debt/asset ratio of 82% in the 12% risk premium
state. These numbers concern the beneﬁts of these policies. To provide a more comprehensive
assessment of the policies, one also needs to evaluate the costs of these interventions.
7 Conclusion
We have presented a model to study the dynamics of risk premia in a crisis episode where
intermediaries’ equity capital is scarce. We calibrate the model and show the model does well
in matching two aspects of crises: the nonlinearity of risk premia in crisis episodes; and, the
recovery from crises in the order of many months. We also use the model to evaluate the
eﬀectiveness of central bank policies, ﬁnding that infusing equity capital into intermediaries
is the most eﬀective policy in our model.
A limitation of our model is that it does not shed any light on the connection between
the performance of intermediated asset markets we model (i.e. the mortgage-backed securities
market) and the aggregate stock market. Yet, as we have seen during the subprime crisis, the
deterioration in intermediation does spillover to the S&P500. It will be interesting to explore
such a connection by introducing a second asset, in positive supply, that the households invest
in directly. Such an asset can represent the S&P500 and may shed light on the equity premium
puzzle. Introducing such an asset is also likely to dampen the over-sensitive interest rate eﬀect
that is present in our model.
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45A ODE Solution
In this appendix, we detail the ODE that characterizes the equilibrium. We analyze our ODE based
on state variable y, i.e., the scaled households wealth. Denote the dynamics of yt as,
dyt = µydt + σydZt, (21)
for unknown functions µy and σy
We write
dct
ct and dRt as functions of µy,σy and the derivatives of F(y). Because ct =








1 + l − ρy
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ρ




































































σyσ = ρ + γg −
γρh
1 − ρhy
























A.1 Derivation of µy and σy
We rewrite equation (10) which describes the wealth dynamics (budget constraint) of the household
sector as:
dwh = θsdP + Dθsdt + rˆ θbdt + lDtdt − ρwhdt. (23)
In this equation,




are the number of shares that the risky asset household owns, and
ˆ θbD = wh − θsP (25)
is the amount of funds that the risky asset and debt households together have invested in the riskless
bond. αh and αI are deﬁned in the text and depends on whether the economy is constrained or not.
We apply Ito’s Lemma to P = DF(y) to ﬁnd expressions for the drift and diﬀusion of dP. We
can then substitute back into equation (23) to ﬁnd expressions for the drift and diﬀusion of dwh.
46Now, we have deﬁned wh = Dy. We apply Ito’s Lemma to this equation to arrive at a second
expression for the drift and diﬀusion of dwh. Matching the drift and diﬀusion terms from these two
ways of writing dwh, we solve to ﬁnd µy and σy.
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r = ρ + gγ −
ργ
1 + l − ρy
θs + l + (r − g) ˆ θb − ρy + σ2















We deﬁne a function, G(y) ≡ 1
1−θsF0; with this deﬁnition, we can write G0 = θsG2F00, and
σy = −
ˆ θb
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θsF
− (1 + γ)
1 + l − ρy + ρGˆ θb
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1 + l + ρy(γ − 1)
1 + l − ρy + ργGˆ θb
￿
(26)









1 + l − ρy
!
y − Gˆ θb
θsF
"
1 + l − ρy − ρGˆ θb








θs + l + ˆ θb(g(γ − 1) + ρ) − ρy
1 + l − ρy + ργGˆ θb
.
The expressions for the bond holding ˆ θb and risky asset holding θs depend on whether the
economy is constrained or not. In the unconstrained region, as shown in Section 3.3, αh = 1, and
αI = F
F−λy. Utilizing (25) and (24), we have θs =
(1−λ)y
F−λy , and b θb = λy
F−y
F−λy. In the constrained
region αh =
m(F−y)
(1−λ)y , αI = 1
1+m
F
F−y, therefore θs = m
1+m, and b θb = y − m
1+mF. Finally, as illustrated
in Section 3.3, the cutoﬀ for the constraint satisﬁes yc = m
1−λ+mF(yc), and the economy is in the
unconstrained region if 0 < y ≤ yc.
A.3 Boundary conditions and technical parameter restriction
The upper boundary condition is described in Section 3.5. A lower boundary condition occurs when
y → 0. This case corresponds to one where specialists hold the entire ﬁnancial wealth of the economy.
Using L’Hopital’s rule, it is easy to check that G−1
θsF →
F0(0)
F(0) . Plugging this result into (26), and noting
that both θs and b θb go to zero as y goes to zero, we obtain,
F (0) =
1 + F0 (0)l






When l = 0, one can check that F (0) is the equilibrium Price/Dividend ratio for the economy with
the specialists as the representative agent. However because in our model the growth of the household
sector aﬀects the pricing kernel, this boundary P/D ratio F (0) also depends on the household’s labor
income l. As in the case where l = 0, for the P/D ratio to be well deﬁned we require that parameters
satisfy,
ρ + g(γ − 1) +






Furthermore, a straightforward calculation yields that F0 ￿
yb￿
= 1 if F(yb) = yb. This result
also ensures that the mapping from the scaled household’s wealth y to the scaled specialist wealth
48w/D = F (y) − y is strictly decreasing in the scaled household’s wealth y (this monotone relation
clearly fails if F
￿
yb￿
> yb.) As a result, it is equivalent to model either agent’s wealth as our state
variable.
A.4 Numerical Method
In our ODE (26) both boundaries are singular, causing diﬃculties in directly applying the built-in








yb − η,yb − η
￿
(where η is suﬃciently small), and adopt a “forward-shooting
and line-connecting” method for the lower–end boundary. Take a small ￿ > 0 and call e F as the
attempted solution. For each trial φ ≡ e F0 (￿), we set e F0 (0) = φ, solve e F (0) based on (27), and let
e F (￿) = e F (0)+φ￿. Since
￿
￿, e F (￿)
￿
is away from the singularity, by trying diﬀerent φ’s we apply the
standard shooting method to obtain the desired solution F that connects at
￿
yb − η,yb − η
￿
. For
y < ￿, we simply approximate the solution by a line connecting (0,F (0)) and (￿,F (￿)). In other
words, we solve F on
￿
￿,yb￿
with a smooth pasting condition for F0 (￿) =
F(￿)−F(0)
￿ and a value




We use ￿ = 0.1 and η = 0.001 which give ODE errors bounded by 3 × 10−5 for y > ￿. Diﬀerent
￿’s and η’s deliver almost identical solutions for y > 1. Because we are mainly interested in the
solution behavior near yc (which takes a value of 14 even in the m = 1 case) and onwards, our main
calibration results are free of the approximation errors caused by the choice of ￿ and η. Finally we
ﬁnd that, in fact, these errors are at the same magnitude as those generated by the capital constraint
around yc (3.5× 10−5).
B Veriﬁcation of optimality
In this section we take the equilibrium Price/Dividend ratio F (y) as given, and verify that the
specialist’s consumption policy c = Dt (1 + l − yt) is optimal subject to his budget constraint. Our
argument is a variant of the standard one: it uses the strict concavity of u(·) and the specialist’s
budget constraint to show that the specialist’s Euler equation is necessary and suﬃcent for the
optimality of his consumption plan.





t (1 + l − ρyt)
−γ .
Consider another consumption proﬁle b c which satisﬁes the budget constraint E
R ∞
0 b ctξtdt ≤ ξ0D0 (F0 − y0)
(recall that the specialist’s wealth is D0 (F0 − y0); here we require that the specialist’s feasible trading







e−ρtu(b ct)dt + E
Z ∞
0
















ξtctdt = ξ0D0 (F0 − y0),
then the result follows. Somewhat surprisingly, for our model this seemingly obvious claim requires
an involved argument because of the singularity at yb = 1+l
ρ .
One can easily check that, for ∀T > 0, we have






σ (Dt,yt)dZt + ξTDT (FT − yT), (29)
where σ(Dt,yt) corresponds to the specialist’s equilibrium trading strategy (which involves terms
such as (1 + l − ρy)
−γ−1 and is NOT uniformly bounded as y → yb). Our goal in the following steps
is to show that in expectation, the latter two terms vanishes when T → ∞.
Step 1: Limiting Behavior of y at yb The critical observation regarding the evolution of y is
that when y approaches yb, it approximately follows a Bessel process with a dimension δ = γ+2 > 2.




i , which is the Euclidean distance between Z and the origin.) According to standard
results on Bessel processes, yb is an entrance-no-exit point, and is not reachable if the starting value
y0 < yb (if δ > 2). Intuitively, when y is close to yb, the dominating part of µy is proportional to
1
y−yb < 0, while the volatility σy is bounded— therefore a drift that diverges to negative inﬁnity
keeps y away from the singular point yb. This result implies that our economy never hits yb.
To show that for y close to yb, y’s evolution can be approximated by a Bessel Process, one can











1 + l − ρhy







1 + l − ρy
dt − Gσˆ θbdZt.
Utilizing the result F0 ￿
yb￿





ρ , and G ' 1 + m. Let
xt = 1 + l − ρyt;
50then it is easy to show that q = x
Gσˆ θbρ = x








which is just a standard Bessel process with a dimension δ = γ + 2. Therefore, x is also a scaled
version of a Bessel process, and can never reach 0 (or, y cannot reach yb). In the following analysis,
we focus on the limiting behavior of x.
Step 2: Localization Note that in (29), due to the singularityat x = 0 (or, y = yb), both the local
martingale part
R T
0 σ(Dt,yt)dZt and the terminal wealth part ξTDT (FT − yT) are not well-behaved.
To show our claim, we have to localize our economy, i.e., stop the economy once y is suﬃciently close
to yb (or, once D is suﬃciently close to 0). Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne
Tn = inf
￿







where h is a positive constant (as we will see, the choice of h, which is around 1, gives some ﬂexibility
for γ other than 2). Since y and x have a one-to-one relation (x = 1 + l − ρy), for simplicity we
localize x instead.
Clearly this localization technique ensures that the local martingale part
R Tn
0 σ (Dt,yt)dZt is a
martingale (one can check that σ(Dt,yt) is continuous in Dt and yt, in turn Dt and xt; therefore
σ(Dt,yt) is locally bounded). As Tn → ∞ when n → ∞, for our claim we need to show
lim
n→∞
E [ξTnDTn (FTn − yTn)] = 0













Tn (F (yTn) − yTn)
i
.
Since the analysis will be obvious if x−γ (F (y) − y) is uniformly bounded (notice here x = 1+l−ρy),




= yb and F0 ￿
yb￿











can be written as ψ (n) 1
n when n is suﬃciently large, and





ψ (n) → 0





where K is bounded.
We apply existing analytical results in the literature to show our claim. To do so, we have to
















51We want to bound E
￿
e−ρTn￿










; note that they are Laplace
transforms of the ﬁrst-hitting time distribution of a GBM and Bessel processes, respectively. The











where the bold F denotes the distribution function of Tn. The similar relation also holds for TD
n or
Tx
n. Denote FD (·) (or Fx (·)) as the distribution function for TD
n (or Tx
n), and notice that













= 1 − FD (T) − Fx (T) + FD (T)Fx (T),
because 1{T D
n >T} and 1{T x
n>T} are positively correlated (both take the value 1 when Z is high).15














Now we use the standard result of the Laplace transform of the ﬁrst-hitting time distribution for a



















2ρσ2 + (g − 0.5σ2)
2 + g − 0.5σ
2
￿
> (γ − 1)(1 + h),





n(γ−1)(1+h) vanishes as n → ∞. For instance, this condition holds when
h = 0.9 under our parameterization.
Step 3: Regulated Bessel Process The challenging task is the second term. Notice that our
economy (i.e., evolution of x) diﬀers from the evolution of a Bessel process when x is far away from 0;
therefore an extra care needs to be taken. We consider a regulated Bessel process which is reﬂected






as the reﬂection makes xt to hit 1
n more likely (therefore, a larger Fx). Also, for a suﬃciently small
15Technically, using the technique of Malliavian derivatives, we can show that both xs and Ds
have positive diﬀusions in the martingale representations for all s. Then, the running minimum
xT = min{xt : 0 < t < T} and DT = min{Dt : 0 < t < T} have positive loadings always on the
martingale representations (using the technique in Methods of Mathematical Finance, Karatzas and
Shreve (1998), Page 367). The same technique can be applied to 1{T x
n>T} = 1{xT>T} and 1{T D
n >T} =
1{DT>T}, as an indicator function can be approximated by a sequence of diﬀerentiable increasing
functions.
52x > 0, when x ∈ (0,x], x can be approximated by a Bessel process with a dimension γ + 2 − ε.
Therefore, Fx must be bounded by the ﬁrst-hitting time distribution of a Bessel process with a
dimension δ, where δ takes value from γ + 2 − ￿ to γ + 2, where ￿ is suﬃciently small. Finally, note
that by considering a Bessel process we are neglecting certain drift for x. However, one can easily
check that when x is close to 0, the adjustment term for µy is −1+l
ρ γσ2 < 0. This implies that we
are neglecting a positive drift for x—which potentially makes hitting less likely—thereby yielding an
upper-bound estimate.
We have the following Lemma from the Bessel process.
Lemma 1 Consider a Bessel process x with δ > 2 which is reﬂected at x > 0. Let ν = δ
2 − 1.
Starting from x0 ≤ x, we consider the hitting time Tx
n = inf
￿
t : xt = 1
n
￿





∝ n−2ν as n → ∞
Proof. Due to the standard results in Bessel process and the Laplace transform of the hitting time





















and Iv (·) (and Kv (·)) is modiﬁed Bessel function of the ﬁrst (and second) kind of order v. Because
R is a reﬂecting barrier, the boundary condition is
ϕ0 (x) = 0,
which pins down the constants c1 and c2 (up to a constant multiplication; notice that this does not af-










is determined by nνKv
￿√
2ρn−1￿
as Kv dominates Iv near 0. Since Kv (x) has a growth rate x−ν when x → 0, the result is established.
For any y0, redeﬁne starting point as x0 = min(1 + l − y0,x); clearly this leads to an upper-





. However, since for all δ ∈ [γ + 2 − ￿,γ + 2], the above Lemma tells





∝ n(γ−1)(1+h)n−2ν = n(γ−1)(1+h)−γ+ε → 0
uniformly if γ = 2 and h = 0.9 (and for some suﬃciently small ￿ > 0). Therefore we obtain our
desirable result.
Finally ctξt > 0 implies that
R ∞





0 ξtctdt = ξ0D0 (F0 − y0) holds for all stopping times that converge to
inﬁnity. Q.E.D.
53C Appendix for Section 6
C.1 Borrowing Subsidy












C.2 Direct Asset Purchase
In this case, the intermediary holds 1 − s of the risky asset (where s is a function of (y,D)). In the
unconstrained region, αh = 1, and
αI ￿
w + αh (1 − λ)wh￿
P
= 1 − s
which implies that αI =
(1−s)F




(1 − s)(1 − λ)y
F − λy
,
and the total holding is θs = θI
s + s =
(1−s)(1−λ)y
F−λy + s(y,D).
In the constrained region, αh =
m(F−y)



























The same constraint cutoﬀ applies yc = m
1−λ+mFc.
Finally, the formal expressions for the case of capital infusion (i.e., changing m) is isomorphic to
the case of s > 0.
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